Hedonistic Utilitarianism and Ignorance: or the case of the molesting Hypnotist
In coversation I once posed the following case to some students of mine. I wasn't sure if it had any real philosophical significance, but I have increasingly come to think that there might be. The issues seem to be: 1) must I know that I have been harmed in order to actually be harmed? 2)Can there be moral value in my ignorance of harm?
Here is the case:
Mr NN is feeling sad, has aches and pains, and is geneally a drain on the sum of global well-being. Dr. HH is a hypnotist, and though no one else knows it also is a habitual molester of patients. Let us stipulate that the molestation leaves no trace except in the memory of HH because HH uses his perfect hypnotic abilities to supress any memory the patient might have. So, in a fit of despair, NN decides to try hypnotism, and visits HH. HH hypnotises NN, molests NN (significantly increasing HH's hapiness) and further leaves NN with severeal hypnotic suggestions: a) that he feels better, b) that hypnotism is working for him, c) that he should recommend that others try hypnotism, too, and d) that he should return soon for more treatment.
HH awakens NN who now feels great, leaves happily thinking hypnotism is great, and who goes on to recommend that other try hypnotism soon. HH is overcome with good feeling from molesting NN, and from the anticpation of NN's return along with the possibility of new clients coming in at NN's recommendation.
The hedonic lay of the land seems to be this: so long as HH gives no indication to his patients taht they have been fondled, and so long as the hypnotism relieves the suffering of NN and friends while successfully supressing their memories, a traditional henonistic utilitarianism will judge a world full of molesting hypnotists superior to a world without them.
Ordinary moral intuitions (and those of most students) seem to be at odds with this result. The information context (which ordinarily would not ordinarily seem to be relevant to moral evaluation) seems to be making the difference here. So, whats up?
Here is the case:
Mr NN is feeling sad, has aches and pains, and is geneally a drain on the sum of global well-being. Dr. HH is a hypnotist, and though no one else knows it also is a habitual molester of patients. Let us stipulate that the molestation leaves no trace except in the memory of HH because HH uses his perfect hypnotic abilities to supress any memory the patient might have. So, in a fit of despair, NN decides to try hypnotism, and visits HH. HH hypnotises NN, molests NN (significantly increasing HH's hapiness) and further leaves NN with severeal hypnotic suggestions: a) that he feels better, b) that hypnotism is working for him, c) that he should recommend that others try hypnotism, too, and d) that he should return soon for more treatment.
HH awakens NN who now feels great, leaves happily thinking hypnotism is great, and who goes on to recommend that other try hypnotism soon. HH is overcome with good feeling from molesting NN, and from the anticpation of NN's return along with the possibility of new clients coming in at NN's recommendation.
The hedonic lay of the land seems to be this: so long as HH gives no indication to his patients taht they have been fondled, and so long as the hypnotism relieves the suffering of NN and friends while successfully supressing their memories, a traditional henonistic utilitarianism will judge a world full of molesting hypnotists superior to a world without them.
Ordinary moral intuitions (and those of most students) seem to be at odds with this result. The information context (which ordinarily would not ordinarily seem to be relevant to moral evaluation) seems to be making the difference here. So, whats up?
posted by Dr. Plausible Deniability at
1/11/2006 11:32:00 AM
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