Hedonistic Utilitarianism and Ignorance: or the case of the molesting Hypnotist
In coversation I once posed the following case to some students of mine. I wasn't sure if it had any real philosophical significance, but I have increasingly come to think that there might be. The issues seem to be: 1) must I know that I have been harmed in order to actually be harmed? 2)Can there be moral value in my ignorance of harm?
Here is the case:
Mr NN is feeling sad, has aches and pains, and is geneally a drain on the sum of global well-being. Dr. HH is a hypnotist, and though no one else knows it also is a habitual molester of patients. Let us stipulate that the molestation leaves no trace except in the memory of HH because HH uses his perfect hypnotic abilities to supress any memory the patient might have. So, in a fit of despair, NN decides to try hypnotism, and visits HH. HH hypnotises NN, molests NN (significantly increasing HH's hapiness) and further leaves NN with severeal hypnotic suggestions: a) that he feels better, b) that hypnotism is working for him, c) that he should recommend that others try hypnotism, too, and d) that he should return soon for more treatment.
HH awakens NN who now feels great, leaves happily thinking hypnotism is great, and who goes on to recommend that other try hypnotism soon. HH is overcome with good feeling from molesting NN, and from the anticpation of NN's return along with the possibility of new clients coming in at NN's recommendation.
The hedonic lay of the land seems to be this: so long as HH gives no indication to his patients taht they have been fondled, and so long as the hypnotism relieves the suffering of NN and friends while successfully supressing their memories, a traditional henonistic utilitarianism will judge a world full of molesting hypnotists superior to a world without them.
Ordinary moral intuitions (and those of most students) seem to be at odds with this result. The information context (which ordinarily would not ordinarily seem to be relevant to moral evaluation) seems to be making the difference here. So, whats up?
Here is the case:
Mr NN is feeling sad, has aches and pains, and is geneally a drain on the sum of global well-being. Dr. HH is a hypnotist, and though no one else knows it also is a habitual molester of patients. Let us stipulate that the molestation leaves no trace except in the memory of HH because HH uses his perfect hypnotic abilities to supress any memory the patient might have. So, in a fit of despair, NN decides to try hypnotism, and visits HH. HH hypnotises NN, molests NN (significantly increasing HH's hapiness) and further leaves NN with severeal hypnotic suggestions: a) that he feels better, b) that hypnotism is working for him, c) that he should recommend that others try hypnotism, too, and d) that he should return soon for more treatment.
HH awakens NN who now feels great, leaves happily thinking hypnotism is great, and who goes on to recommend that other try hypnotism soon. HH is overcome with good feeling from molesting NN, and from the anticpation of NN's return along with the possibility of new clients coming in at NN's recommendation.
The hedonic lay of the land seems to be this: so long as HH gives no indication to his patients taht they have been fondled, and so long as the hypnotism relieves the suffering of NN and friends while successfully supressing their memories, a traditional henonistic utilitarianism will judge a world full of molesting hypnotists superior to a world without them.
Ordinary moral intuitions (and those of most students) seem to be at odds with this result. The information context (which ordinarily would not ordinarily seem to be relevant to moral evaluation) seems to be making the difference here. So, whats up?
posted by Dr. Plausible Deniability at
1/11/2006 11:32:00 AM
5 Comments:
Toward the end, you say that the "information context" seems to be making a difference in the case of the hypnotist/molestor.
First, what do you mean by "information context?" The context driving ordinary intuitions could be that it is wrong for the molestor to hypnotize his patients so that he can have his way with them, or it could be that it is wrong for the molestor to exploit NN's despair which has caused him to do something irrational, i.e., go to a hypnotist.
Second, why assume that ordinary intuitions are driven by context at all?
Finally, shouldn't we ask people what they think?
By
Stan, at 4:09 PM
I think cases like this show that the answer to your question #1 is "no". You can be harmed without realizing it. (I've an old post discussing this more, here.)
By
Richard Y Chappell, at 10:07 PM
I'd say that given some pretty unlikely assumptions (that the hypnotist is a perfect hypnotist, that he ONLY molests when performing perfect hypnosis, that there is no potential for the person to find out etc)
then yeshe has improved the sum of well being. In fact the paitients desire not to be mollested doesn't seem like a hugely rational one. (rather at odds with the 'yuck factor' of course but thats probably because the yuck factor is wrong)
Having said that the law can't be expected to know all the asumptions hold so it should punish the man regardless in oprder to discourage the behaviour in general.
By
Genius, at 1:43 PM
Did you abandon this blog? It looks like you started out pretty strong and then just gave up.
Hypnotism
By
Anonymous, at 9:54 AM
You've been tagged by Joe to share seven random things about you. Check out Joe's 7 random things meme for more information.
By
Stan, at 7:29 PM
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